



This is the final peer-reviewed accepted manuscript published in 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION (Elsevier): When 
Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link between Just Deserts and onesty, 
Fabio Galeotti, Reuben Kline, Raimondello Orsini 
 






© [2017]. This manuscript version is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-















(This item was downloaded from IRIS Università di Bologna (https://cris.unibo.it/) 
When citing, please refer to the published version. 
When Foul Play Seems Fair: Exploring the Link
between Just Deserts and Honesty∗
Fabio Galeotti† Reuben Kline‡ Raimondello Orsini§
August 2, 2017
Abstract
The distributive justice norm of “just deserts”—i.e. the notion that one gets what
one deserves—is an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important
factor in economic and social exchange. We experimentally investigate the effect of
violations of the distributive justice norm of “just deserts” on honesty in a setting
where behaving dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of
the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then test a
more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce dishonesty, even in cases
where dishonesty does not have redistributive consequences. Our results confirm this
proposition but only for cases in which the violation of just deserts also entails income
inequality.
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Just Deserts & Dishonesty Galeotti, Kline & Orsini
“If people feel that they are taken
advantage of, why should they not rip
off the system in return?”
— Elster (1989)
1 Introduction: Honesty and Just Deserts
Norms play a crucial role in the functioning of any socio-economic system. In particular
the norms of trust and honesty are important norms for economic, political and legal de-
velopment (Guiso et al., 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Rothstein and Uslaner,
2005; Zak and Knack, 2001; Mazar and Ariely, 2006) as they reduce the riskiness of market
transactions in a world of uncertainty and incomplete contracts (Robert and Arnab, 2013).
While trust and honesty help facilitate market exchange, a market economy paradigmatically
relies on a meritocratic equity norm or just deserts —i.e. the notion that one gets what one
deserves—to give legitimacy to the inequality of the distribution of income in society (Miller,
1979; Arnold, 1987; Mankiw, 2010). The presumption of this norm is that one deserves the
income one has, as a function of merit. We define merit as productivity (the result of skill
plus effort), adopting the economic approach of rewarding merit on the basis of consequences:
actions are to be rewarded for the good they do, so that incentives are well defined to produce
a more efficient society in the long run. While the belief in the extent to which just deserts
should play a role in the distribution of income within a society varies across individuals in
large part as a function of political ideology (Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; d’Anjou et al., 1995;
Mitchell et al., 2003), and context (Scott and Bornstein, 2009), most individuals in advanced
industrial societies support the principle of merit as one (perhaps among several) criterion in
decisions regarding distributive justice (Scott et al., 2001; Kunovich and Slomczynski, 2007).
In this study, we investigate the relationship between these norms: honesty on the one
hand, and just deserts on the other. Our principal hypothesis is that violations of the norm
of just deserts encourage and justify dishonest behavior as a corrective mechanism against
meritocratic inequity, inducing those who feel that the system is inequitable, to “rip it off”
in turn. To test our hypothesis, we conduct two earned-income laboratory experiments
in which we manipulate the just deserts and inequality of the payoffs from a real effort
task as a function of performance relative to the median. In Experiment 1, we focus on a
specific setting where dishonesty is instrumental to redistribute income between a person
who benefited from inequity and another who did not. The aim is to study the interplay
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between inequity, dishonesty and distributional concerns.1 In the experiment, we pair high-
performing subjects with low-performing subjects, allowing the high performers to record
the outcomes of a series of private signals in which a misrepresentation of the signals can
materially benefit the high performer at the expense of the low performer. High-performing
but rule-disadvantaged subjects in the inequitable conditions are expected to behave more
dishonestly in order to restore distributional justice. In Experiment 2, we test a more general
proposition that the mere experience of inequity induces more dishonesty quite independently
from re-distributional concerns. The experimental setting is analogous to the one used in
Experiment 1 except that subjects are not matched in pairs. Hence, in Experiment 2, the
misrepresentation of the signals does not affect others’ earnings.
Our experimental design brings together two growing trends in experimental and be-
havioral economics: experiments on dishonesty and lying behavior, the majority of which
follow the paradigms laid out in Gneezy (2005) and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
and real-effort experiments in which income (or a privileged role) is “earned” by performance
on a quiz or task embedded in the experiment (Hoffman et al., 1994; Ruffle, 1998; Rutström
and Williams, 2000; Jakiela, 2011; Esarey et al., 2012; Balafoutas et al., 2013; Durante et al.,
2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly survey the related
literature. In section 3, we describe the experimental design and the behavioral predictions
of Experiment 1. In section 4 we show and discuss the results. Section 5 reports the
experimental design, predictions and results of Experiment 2. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is extensive evidence that individuals care not only about the nature of the final
distribution of income but also about the procedures that brought it about (e.g. Rabin, 1993;
Hoffman et al., 1994; Konow, 1996, 2000; Frey et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Almås et al.,
2010; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Jakiela, 2011; Grimalda et al., 2016). There are numerous theoreti-
cal and empirical studies of meritocracy in the behavioral economic tradition, with a number
of theoretical conceptions of merit-based equity having been put forth, often combined with
experimental tests.
Konow (1996, 2000) develops the “accountability principle” in which individuals are to be
held responsible for outcomes under their control but not for factors outside of their control.
1Previous studies focused on the relationship between procedural fairness and distributional preferences
(see next section). The main novelty of our experiment is to test whether this relationship holds in a context
where subjects must forgo the honesty norm in order to restore equity.
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Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) and Ooghe et al. (2007) develop a similar concept they
call “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism”. Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010) manipulate the
sources of rewards (i.e., whether they are earned or a result of luck) to test meta-preferences
for equity, such as strict egalitarianism, libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism, the latter
of which is functionally equivalent to Konow’s accountability principle. Though they find
heterogeneous preferences among their experimental subjects, there is a preponderance of
“liberal egalitarians.” Almås et al. (2010) demonstrate, through the use of a modified dictator
game, that acceptance of equitable inequality (i.e. inequality generated by differential returns
to effort and achievement) tends to develop during early adolescence. Taken together, these
results demonstrate that just deserts is an important criterion for establishing the equitability
of income distributions. Our study builds on these to investigate the link between (un)just
deserts and (dis)honesty.
In the laboratory, meritocracy is typically operationalized by assigning initial endowments
and/or experimental roles based on performance on a task or quiz embedded within the
experiment. In these designs high performance is rewarded with either a larger endowment or
a privileged experimental role. This condition is then typically contrasted with a condition in
which the endowments or roles are randomly assigned. Among the first to use quizzes and/or
tasks—as opposed to chance—to assign roles and/or initial endowments in an experimental
setting, Hoffman et al. (1994) find that assigning the role of proposer in the Ultimatum game
based on high performance on a quiz, causes responders to accept more unequal income
allocations. Burrows and Loomes (1994) find that whether group income was earned or
randomly assigned affects behavior in bargaining over the final allocation of payments. Ruffle
(1998) finds that in ultimatum and dictator games proposers reward the effort that recipients
put forth in an experimental task. This large, interdisciplinary literature offers considerable
evidence that just deserts is an important, though not exclusive, determinant of distributive
preferences, and that it can be meaningfully operationalized and manipulated in the lab.
There is also a rapidly growing interest in the behavioral economics of cheating and
dishonesty. A large literature has grown out of a paradigm developed in Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In this paradigm, subjects roll a die in private, the outcome of which
determines their earnings (and/or the earnings of another subject) in one way or another.
The subjects, however, are free to misreport the outcome of the die roll. Researchers are
then able to determine whether certain outcomes of the die roll are observed with greater
frequency than others. What is often observed is that while subjects, in the aggregate, do
misrepresent the outcome, they do not do so in a way which maximizes their earnings. This
paradigm has, in a short time, generated a large amount of literature (Bucciol and Piovesan,
2011; Shalvi et al., 2011; Suri et al., 2011; Shalvi et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2017, among many
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others).
Several papers have made apparent that lies have a moral and psychological cost. Gneezy
(2005) reports experimental evidence indicating that people do not like to lie. Erat and
Gneezy (2012) show that many people may dislike lying even in situations where such de-
ception brings material gains for everyone. Cappelen et al. (2013) argue that people face
different costs of lying, while Gneezy et al. (2013) propose an experimental design explicitly
aimed at measuring subjects’ degree of lying aversion. The moral cost of lying seems to be
context dependent, being influenced by different factors, such as the distribution of infor-
mation, the material consequences of lying, the belief to be believed or not by partners, etc.
We propose to add the perception of just deserts to the list of factors affecting the moral
and psychological costs of breaking the “honesty social norm.” We operationalize this factor
in our experiment by manipulating the equity of the remuneration system used to allocate
resources among the experimental subjects as a function of performance on a real effort task.
In our design, the experimenter has complete information regarding the true outcomes,
and therefore rather than rely on deviations from expected frequencies, we know whether
dishonesty has occurred in each specific instance. This allows us to conduct an individual-
level analysis of the data. The potential disadvantage is that subjects might be aware of the
fact that cheating can be observed, and this could affect behavior, by perhaps increasing the
cost of lying. This should however equally apply to all our treatments, and only influence the
absolute level of dishonest behavior and not the relative comparison between our treatments.
In addition, previous studies find that the effect of having the experimenter or an anonymous
observer to verify behavior is only minor (e.g. Bäker and Mechtel, 2015; van de Ven and
Villeval, 2015; Houser et al., 2016; Gneezy et al., 2016). There are few recent studies that
employ variants of the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)’s task with a “full information”
set-up similar to ours. Maggian and Villeval (2016) investigate altruistic and selfish lies in
children. Like us, they ask subjects to truthfully or untruthfully report the outcome of a
randomly generated binary signal. Kocher et al. (2016) study dishonesty in groups by asking
subjects to watch one of six videos of a die roll on a computer and report the outcome
(which is known by the experimenter). To study the structure of the intrinsic cost of lying,
Gneezy et al. (2016) ask participants to report the number that appears behind one of ten
boxes in their computer screen. A similar approach is used by Abeler et al. (2016) who
ask participants to take coins from an envelope based on a randomly drawn chip in the
computer. These studies, though using a similar dishonesty task to ours, do not investigate
the relationship between dishonesty and just deserts.
Within the literature on cheating and lying behavior, Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010)
and Houser et al. (2012) are closely related to our study. Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010)
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investigate whether a subject is more or less likely to dishonestly help or hurt another
individual depending on the relative wealth of the two subjects. In Gino and Pierce (2009),
the wealth levels are manipulated through an initial lottery. Hence, unlike our study, the
income distribution is not a function of merit. In Experiment 2 of Gino and Pierce (2010), the
initial wealth of the subjects is determined by a third-person subjective evaluation of their
creativity in a writing task, and, therefore, the link with merit is questionable. In addition,
high-evaluated subjects always receive a higher payment than low-evaluated subjects. Hence,
equity and equality are confounded. Finally, the subject who behaves dishonestly affects the
other subject’s payoff but he/she receives a flat fee irrespectively of his/her behavior.
Houser et al. (2012) study whether people who are treated unfairly in a dictator game
are more likely to cheat in a subsequent task. They find that subjects who are given a
small allocation in a dictator game are more likely to (self-servingly) cheat when reporting
the outcome of a subsequent coin flip, thereby increasing their total payoff. Their study
does not involve earned income manipulations, thus they posit that the increase in dishonest
behavior is a result of a perceived violation of an egalitarian norm. Our study employs a
similar design to investigate whether dishonesty can result from perceived violations of other
equity norms, in particular the norm of just deserts.
Finally, there is a literature that looks at the effects of unfair treatment and bad intentions
on cheating in the workplace. Greenberg (1990) finds that employees who experience a cut
in their wage display higher theft rates, especially when the pay cuts are not adequately
explained. In a laboratory setting, Greenberg (1993) finds that subjects who are told that
they would be given a lower wage than a promised one take more money when they are
asked to pay themselves. In both cases, the focus is not on just deserts but on whether a
pay lower than a prior or promised one induces (more) stealing. Gill et al. (2013) investigate
experimentally the effects of random bonuses on cheating and productivity. The authors find
that random bonuses increase cheating behavior possibly because they are perceived as unfair
by the subjects. John et al. (2014) find that people who get lower pay-rates than others,
and are aware of this, cheat more. In both studies, the payment is determined randomly
and there is no rationale based on merit that justifies the difference in payments between
subjects. This is not the case in our experiment where differences in payment are determined
by prior performance.
3 Experiment 1
In this section, we describe the experimental design and then we state the main hypothe-
ses of our first experiment.
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3.1 Participants and Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted at Stony Brook University (SBU) between April
2012 and February 2013. We recruited 164 subjects using the on-line recruitment system
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). At the end of each session subjects were paid in cash and in private
at the subjects’ stations. Average payment was $17.06. Each session lasted around 40-60
minutes, including instructions and final payments. The experiment was computerized and
programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Computer desks were divided
by partitions in order to avoid eye contact between subjects. Subjects received neutral
instructions both on their computer screen and on paper. A copy of the instructions and
demographic information can be found in the on-line appendix.
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was divided into two main stages. First we used a real-effort task to measure
performance and, on that basis, assign initial endowments. Subjects were classified as high
or low-performing based on their relative performance in the real-effort task. This binary
categorization of the participants followed the method used in Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010);
then we employed a custodial stage where, for each pair of subjects, we measured the level
of dishonesty of one subject who was asked to record the transfers of money from a second
subject’s “escrow” account to her own account. After the two main stages, subjects performed
a second real-effort task, analogous to the one in the first stage but with a piece-rate pay,
in order to obfuscate the real objective of the experiment and gauge individual motivation
and learning during the experiment. The results of this second real-effort task are not
discussed here and they are available upon request.2 Subjects received separate instructions
at the beginning of each stage. Before paying the subjects, we also collected demographic
information in a post-experiment questionnaire.
3.2.1 Stage 1: The First Real-Effort Task
The real effort task involved counting the occurrences of the letters “e” and “c” for each line
of a 15-line text in the German language (see on-line appendix for more details regarding
the text). We chose this particular task because it provides a high variation in performance,
and it is easy for the subjects to understand. At the same time, it is tedious and mentally
costly for the subjects.
Before starting the task, subjects were informed that, after its completion, they will be
divided into two equally sized groups based on their relative performance. The performance
2In a nutshell, we find a very strong correlation between the performance in the first and second real-effort
task (Spearman’s ρ = 0.677, p < 0.001). Subjects performed slightly better in the second task (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p < 0.001), probably due to a learning-by-doing effect.
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of each subject was measured by taking the deviation in absolute value between the true
number of c’s and e’s in each line of the text and the number recorded by the subject—the
lower the score the higher the performance. Subjects whose performance was above the
median were designated “high performers”, whereas those below the median were designated
“low performers”.3 Ties in performance at the median were randomly broken by the computer
(we had only two cases). Subjects were also told that they will be assigned to one of four
possible scenarios which are defined by how the high and low performers are remunerated
for the task. Each scenario corresponded to a different treatment of the experiment. The
instructions informed the subjects that “in three of the four scenarios the payment to the
high performers will be greater than or equal to the payment to the low performers. In one
out of the four scenarios the payment to the high performers will be less than the payment
to the low performers.”At the end of the task, we also solicited self-reported assessments
of effort on a 0-4 scale. The majority of people (84.15%) reported an effort of 3 or 4, and
only 3.66% of the subjects (6 out of 164 subjects) reported an effort of zero or one. The
performance categorization and the corresponding initial endowment in the first stage was
communicated to each subject immediately before starting the second stage.
3.2.2 Stage 2: The Custodial Task
In the second stage, each subject was matched with another participant. One subject was
assigned the role of participant A, while the other the role of participant B. A was the
Owner of an “escrow” account which was credited with $15. B did not receive any additional
endowment and played (anonymously) the role of the Custodian of the partner’s account.
After the assignment of the custodial relationships, the decision-making element of stage
2 began. Each subject designated as Custodian (B) received a series of 25 consecutive
binary signals generated at random from a symmetric binomial distribution (each signal was
displayed in a new screen). The signal generating process was carefully explained to the
subjects, and it was described as being equivalent to a coin flip. Each signal was either red
or green and known only privately by each Custodian. It was common knowledge that the
revelation of the signal itself was private; that is, only the Custodian, but not the Owner of
the escrow account knew the actual realization of the signal. The experimenters also knew
with certainty the realization of each draw, but, of course, the subjects were anonymous to
the experimenters, and thus the decisions of each subject could not be attributed to them
personally. The color of each signal was meant to instruct the Custodian whether to transfer
3This binary conception of performance allowed us to keep the design and the analysis simple. It also
reflects natural settings in which signals about relative performance are likely to be noisy and imprecise
but nonetheless correlated with the true levels of performance. For a similar approach, see Gino and Pierce
(2009) and Gino and Pierce (2010).
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an amount equal to 1/25 of the escrow account ($0.60) to herself (in case of a green signal)
or leave it in the Owner’s account (in case of a red signal). Each Custodian was asked
to record the color of each signal received. Subjects were instructed that it was only the
recording of the signal that affected payoffs, not the signal itself. Since each signal was
private information of the Custodian, the design allowed the Custodians to misrepresent the
signal enabling them to increase or decrease their own payoff at the expense or benefit of
their partner.4
This particular task allows for possible self-serving redistribution, without any demand
effect towards it. Subjects who choose to misrepresent any signal have to afford a moral
and psychological cost of not doing the right thing. Moreover, the multiple choice design
(having to make 25 consecutive choices) is more reliable than a single choice task, allowing
for a more precise definition of the allocation, since it is much less likely that the subject’s
choice be determined by impulsivity or randomness.
To make sure that subjects understood the procedures, we asked them to complete some
practice rounds with forced input before starting the task. In these rounds, subjects were
encouraged to experiment with the recording of the signals and to observe the effect it had
on payoffs, both theirs and their partner’s. Figure 1 shows the computer screen that it was
seen by the Custodians. During the task, while the Custodians reported the color of the
signals, the (unincentivized) exercise for the Owners was to predict the number of red signals
that the Custodian would report.
Since our aim was to analyze the effect of perceived inequity on honesty, in this first
experiment we confined our analysis on the degree of honesty of those subjects who were
expected to be more sensitive to inequity (i.e. those subjects for which inequity takes place
to their disadvantage). Therefore, the role of Custodian was played by high-performing
subjects.5
To characterize the qualitative nature of the Custodians’ dishonesty, we borrow the ty-
pology developed in Erat and Gneezy (2012). Their typology of lying is based on its effects
on the payoffs of the liar and another party. They differentiate between “altruistic” and
“Pareto” white lies, in which the liar benefits another party, either at his own expense (al-
truistic) or in such a way as to be beneficial to both (Pareto). They define a black lie as
one which is detrimental to the other party. There are “spiteful”—hurting both parties—and
“selfish”—hurting only the other party—black lies. In our experiment, because the reporting
4Maggian and Villeval (2016) adopted a similar task to measure the lying behavior of children. Differently
from us, their game is one-shot, they use shapes—a sun or a star—instead of colors, and subjects can click
several times to make their favorite shape appear.
5Experiment 2 extends the analysis also to the behavior of low performers, that is subjects who benefited
from inequity.
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of the signal has a zero-sum effect on payoffs, if the Custodian is dishonest, it is either a
“selfish black lie” (selfish dishonesty)—when the Custodian reports a red signal as green—or
an “altruistic white lie” (altruistic dishonesty)—when he reports a green signal as red.
Figure 1: Screenshot of Signal Reporting Stage
3.2.3 Treatments
In the experiment, we manipulate the remuneration of the first stage as a function of the
relative performance of the participants in the real-effort task. In particular, we vary the
extent to which the payment mechanism is meritocratic under two alternative conditions:
one where everyone receives the same remuneration, and one where some subjects receive a
higher remuneration than others. This results in four treatments, summarized in Table 1.
The treatments were randomized across sessions.
The most important differences are expected from the comparisons of the inequitable
treatments – EI and UI – with the equitable treatments – EE and UE. To estimate the
sample size necessary to uncover these hypothesized effects, we conduct an a priori power
analysis. This type of analysis would be of limited value without a reasonable estimate of
the treatment differences we would expect in our experiment. Such estimates are typically
based on the results of previous similar studies. The studies which are most similar to ours
are Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010). Each employs “positive inequity” and “negative inequity”
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treatments and pairs up two subjects. In particular, Experiment 2 in Gino and Pierce (2010)
is very similar to our design, because it is the only to employ an earned income allocation
of initial resources. In terms of what they call “dishonest reporting by hurting” (and we
call selfish dishonesty) the average difference between these two treatments across all of
the experiments in the two studies was approximately 0.3. Thus, we follow van de Ven
and Villeval (2015), and estimate the power of our sample sizes to uncover hypothesized
differences of 0.35, 0.3 and 0.25. With these estimates of the differences and assuming a
type-I error rate of α = 0.10, our tests are powered at 0.97, 0.93 and 0.82 respectively.
Generally, a power level of 0.8 is considered acceptable. Thus, we can be relatively confident
that we can uncover our most important hypothesized effects.
Table 1: Treatments of Experiment 1
Equity
Equality Equal/Equitable (48) Equal/Inequitable (48)Unequal/Equitable (34) Unequal/Inequitable (34)
Notes: Number of subjects in parenthesis. In EE (EI), 24 (28) subjects receive a remuneration of $10, while
24 (20) a remuneration of $3. Variation in the number of participants reflects different attendance rates
across sessions.
Treatment UI: Unequal and Inequitable
In this treatment, the high performers receive a compensation of $3 after the first stage,
while the low performers receive $10. Subjects are then randomly paired high with low
performers. Hence, the income distribution between partners can be viewed as both unequal
and inequitable. This treatment is the utmost inequitable since those who perform better in
the real effort task are paid less than their partners who perform worse.
Treatment UE: Unequal and Equitable
In this treatment, the distribution of income is unequal: the high performers receive a
remuneration of $10 after the first stage of the experiment, while low performers receive a
remuneration of $3. Subjects are randomly paired high with low performers. Hence, the
income distribution between partners can be viewed as equitable.6 This treatment captures
the typical meritocratic setting: people earn different incomes as a function of their merit.
6Depending on the relative valuations placed on high and low performance, a high performer could perceive
this scenario as inequitable if she thinks that she was not remunerated enough. While we cannot exclude
this possibility, we believe it is unlikely since we only give subjects one salient reference compensation (i.e.
the one of the partner). In addition, it should have no impact on our results: if anything, it makes more
difficult to detect a difference with the corresponding inequitable treatment (UI).
11
Just Deserts & Dishonesty Galeotti, Kline & Orsini
Treatment EI: Equal and Inequitable
In this treatment, the income distribution is equal: both high and low performers receive
the same payment after the first stage. However, it is inequitable: again, high-performing
subjects are (randomly) paired with low performers in the second stage of the experiment.
If one has even the slimmest belief in just deserts (i.e., that higher performance deserves a
higher reward) then this is an inequitable scenario for a high-performing subject, because
she receives compensation equivalent to her low-performing partner, despite the common
knowledge of her superior performance. This treatment captures the other possible non-
meritocratic situation where people are compensated equally despite differential performance.
It also enables us to control for distributional preferences: subjects are all paid the same
and, therefore, monetary inequality concerns are muted. To control for income effects we
conduct two sub-treatments, in which both high and low performers receive a remuneration
of $10 in the high income sub-treatment and $3 in the low income sub-treatment.
Treatment EE: Equal and Equitable
This treatment is a special case that serves as a base of comparison for the EI treatment.
The distribution of income is equal as in treatment EI. Moreover, it can be seen as equitable:
subjects are (randomly) paired high performers with high performers and low performers with
low performers in the second stage of the experiment.7 Thus, the income distribution among
partners is both equal and equitable because both subjects within each pair are compensated
with the same amount for the same type of performance.8
Because in the EE treatment (and only in the EE) the pairings are homogeneous with
respect to performance, the relative valuation attached to the levels of performance should
not impact the decision at the level of the dyad. There is no information provided within
the context of the experiment that would allow the subjects to differentially assign just
deserts, as the members of each pair are objectively indistinguishable.9 Thus, this treatment
allows us to determine a level of dishonesty that should—by the design of the experiment—
be divorced from concerns of equity. This level can be then compared with the amount of
7This means that in some cases, and in Experiment 1 unique to this treatment, the low performers are
in the decision making role, whereas in each of the others, the high performers are so positioned.
8In EE, subjects are matched within the same type (high-high and low-low performers). This could pro-
duce in-group biases (i.e. subjects behaving nicer towards the other player). We can exclude this possibility
as we do not find any statistically significant difference in behavior between treatments EE and UE (where,
based on the same logic, we should expect an out-group bias).
9High-performing subjects might indirectly perceive some kind of injustice if they compare themselves not
with their matched partner but with the low performing subjects. This should however strengthen our results
if we find a difference with respect to the EI treatment. In addition, we can verify whether the behavior of
high-performing subjects is different from that of low-performing subjects. Finally, we can compare the EE
with the other equitable treatment (UE) testing for any difference in behavior.
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dishonesty observed in the corresponding equal and inequitable treatment (EI). Just as in
the EI treatment, to control for income effects, we conduct two sub-treatments, where both
high and low performers receive a remuneration of $10 (the high income sub-treatment) and
$3 (the low income sub-treatment).
The role assignment for each of the treatments described above is summarized in Table
2.
Table 2: Role-assignment in the four treatments
Treatment Owner Custodian
EE High (Low) performer High (Low) performer
EI Low Performer High Performer
UE Low Performer High Performer
UI Low Performer High Performer
3.3 Behavioral Predictions
Our experimental design enables us to measure the extent to which unjust deserts induces
dishonesty on the part of the Custodians. In our set-up, unjust deserts stems from two
main situations. In one case, the more performing subject is compensated less than the less
performing partner. In another case, she is compensated as much as the less performing
partner.10 We focus on negative or disadvantageous inequity by considering scenarios where
the performance of the decision maker (the Custodian) is higher. This is because we expect
negative or disadvantageous inequity to have a much stronger effect on behavior than pos-
itive or advantageous inequity (see e.g. Bloom, 1999; Gino and Pierce, 2009, 2010).11 We
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1. Meritocratic inequity will induce greater selfish dishonesty (Ds) in those
disadvantaged by the performance-payoff mapping: DEIs > DEEs and DUIs > DUEs .
This hypothesis can be tested by measuring the extent to which the Custodians selfishly
misrepresent the signals in a situation where there is a violation of just deserts compared to
a similar scenario where just deserts is not violated. To control for distributional preferences,
we compare scenarios where the income distribution is equal and the only thing that varies
10A third possible case is when the more performing subject is compensated more than the less performing
partner but not enough. We believe that this case is not particularly relevant for our setting since it would
require an additional reference point (e.g. a prior, or promised earnings) which we do not provide in our
experiment. In our set-up, the only salient reference compensation that we provide is the money that the
partner receives. In addition, this third case should, if anything, induce less dishonesty compared to the
other two cases.
11Scenarios in which the performance of the decision maker is lower than the performance of the other
subject are left for future research.
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is just deserts (EI vs. EE).12 We also compare scenarios where both just and unjust deserts
result in an unequal income distribution (UI vs. UE). If we find no differences in our
comparisons, then we may conclude that just deserts does not affect honesty. If instead we
find any significant difference, this would support our hypothesis that dishonesty increases
as a result of violations of the just deserts principle.
The effect of unjust deserts may depend on whether inequality is present. Indeed, previous
studies indicate that people may be more or less dishonest depending on the consequences
that their lies have on others’ well-being. In particular, people may be (more) less prone
to act dishonestly if it contributes to attenuate (exacerbate) inequality (see e.g. Gneezy,
2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Maggian and Villeval, 2016). In
the context of our experiment, subjects may lie more, to their advantage, in response to
violation of just deserts if this violation also contributes to increase inequality. We thus
state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Meritocratic inequity will induce greater selfish dishonesty if it is associated
to an unequal income distribution: DUIs > DEIs .
We can test this hypothesis by comparing the level of selfish dishonesty in the UI treat-
ment and EI treatment. If we find no difference, we may conclude that, in our setting,
inequality does not add an effect to that of inequity.
In the experimental literature, there is also evidence of “altruistic white lies”, i.e. costly
lies that benefit another person. Erat and Gneezy (2012) find that, in sender-receiver games,
33% of senders are willing to lie in order to increase the earnings of the partner at a personal
cost. Though such behavior is possible in our experiment, we did not expect to observe a
significant amount of it. Indeed, evidence from experiments with a setting similar to ours
indicate that altruistic white lies may be much less frequent than in sender-receiver games.
For example, Maggian and Villeval (2016) find that only 4.81% of their subjects were willing
to misreport a signal to favor their partner. That said, we can still devise some hypotheses
regarding white lies which are analogous to those presented for black lies. Based on previous
results on white lies, we may expect that subjects who care particularly about others’ well-
12Dishonesty may be sensitive to social preferences (see e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009;
Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Maggian and Villeval, 2016). In the context of our experiment, being dishonest
may be confounded with some of these distributional preferences. In particular, inequality averse subjects
may behave more dishonestly to reduce the possible inequality of stage 1. We control for this by comparing
EI and EE. Subjects with competitive or spiteful preferences may also behave more dishonestly to reduce
the income of their counterpart. Any across-treatment differences cannot however be explained by these
preferences since the behavior of competitive or spiteful subjects should be the same in all treatments due
to the zero sum nature of our game, and equivalent to the behavior of self-interested subjects. Finally,
reciprocity does not apply to our case since the owner of the account is not responsible for the income
distribution and did not hurt or help the custodian.
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being (i.e. altruistic individuals or inequality-averse subjects) may be willing to altruistically
misreport a signal to favor the other person. This drive may however be attenuated if—other
things being equal—the other person has already benefited from an unjust allocation of the
initial resources. This effect may be larger if the income distribution is not only unjust but
also unequal. We can state the two following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3. Meritocratic inequity will induce less altruistic dishonesty (Da) on the part
of those disadvantaged by the performance-payoff mapping: DUIa < DUEa and DEIa < DEEa .
Hypothesis 4. Meritocratic inequity will induce even less altruistic dishonesty if it is com-
bined with an unequal income distribution: DUIa < DEIa .
4 Results of Experiment 1
In this section, we present the main results of our experiment. We first focus on selfish
dishonesty, and then on altruistic dishonesty. Afterwards, we consider an alternative measure
of dishonesty that takes into account both selfish and altruistic dishonesty. Next, we explore
the dynamics of dishonesty by looking at whether dishonesty changes over time. Finally, we
test the robustness of our results in a regression analysis.
4.1 Selfish dishonesty
We define the rate of selfish dishonesty as the number of red signals that a subject reports
as green divided by the total number of red signals that he or she received, yielding one
observation per subject. This variable provides a normalized measure of the rate of (selfish)
black lies. Figure 2 displays the rates of selfish dishonesty for each experimental treatment.
Since we did not detect any statistically significant difference between the high and low
income sub-treatments of the EE and EI treatment respectively (p = 0.513 and 0.678), we
pooled the data of the sub-treatments together to increase power. Nor did we find any
statistically significant difference between the rates of selfish dishonesty of high and low
performers in the EE treatment (p = 0.470), so we pool these data as well.
In order to justify our pooling across these sub-treatments, we conduct a power analysis
which estimates, given our observed data, what sample size would be required to find a
statistically significant effect at α = 0.10. These estimates are 372, 275 and 195 subjects
per condition for EE high vs. low income; EI high vs. low income; and EE high vs. low
performers, respectively. Given that even the smallest of these estimates is much larger than
most such laboratory studies, this pooling appears to be appropriate.
The rate of selfish dishonesty lies between the 14% of the EE treatment and the 34%
of the UI treatment. While this, at first sight, might seem quite low if one considers that
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a rational and profit-maximizing agent should always misreport a red signal, it is actually
in line with the results of other studies on lying behavior. For instance, the proportion of
income maximizers estimated by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) is 22%, while Dai
et al. (2017) estimates a 28%. More in general, the meta-study of Abeler et al. (2016)
indicates that people appropriate only 21.6% of the gains they could make by lying. Similar
percentages of lying behavior are observed in cheating games where the experimenter has
complete information regarding the individual lying behavior. For instance, Gneezy et al.
(2016) find that between 26% and 33% of subjects lie in these observed games.
It seems that the inequitable treatments (EI and UI) were characterized by a much
greater degree of selfish dishonesty. With non-parametric tests we can investigate more
formally whether there is any significant difference in the rates of selfish dishonesty across
treatments, to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.13 If we compare the rate of selfish dishonesty across
treatments, in the aggregate, we observe significantly higher rates of selfish dishonesty in the
UI treatment compared to the UE and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.061 and 0.019),
and in the EI treatment compared to the UE and EE treatment respectively (p = 0.067
and p = 0.011). There is no significant difference between UI and EI (p = 0.989), and
between EE and UE (p = 0.567). Based on these findings, we present our first result which
is consistent with Hypothesis 1 but rejects Hypothesis 2:14
Result 1. There is more selfish dishonesty in the inequitable treatments than in their cor-
responding equitable treatments. Inequality does not amplify the effect of inequity.
4.2 Altruistic dishonesty
We now turn to altruistic white lies. We define the rate of altruistic dishonesty as the
number of green signals reported as red divided by the total number of green signals received.
This variable provides a normalized measure of the rate of white lies. Figure 2 displays
the average rates of altruistic dishonesty for each experimental treatment.15 The rates of
altruistic dishonesty are much lower than the rates of selfish dishonesty (Wilcoxon signed-
13Throughout the paper, we employ Mann-Whitney U tests unless otherwise specified. All tests are two-
sided. For one-sided hypotheses, we also conduct one-sided statistical tests (available upon request). The
results are qualitatively the same.
14We did not detect any statistically significant difference across treatments in the number of red signals
received by the Custodians (p > 0.1 for all comparisons), so this result, as well as the following findings,
cannot be explained by differences in the number of red signals—randomly generated by the computer for
each Custodian—received by different Custodians across treatments.
15As for the analysis of the black lies, we checked whether there is any statistically significant difference
between the high and low income sub-treatments of the EE and EI treatment respectively. We also checked
for any statistically significant difference between the rates of altruistic dishonesty of high and low performers
in the EE treatment. In all these comparisons, we did not find any difference (p > 0.1), and, therefore, we
pooled the data together.
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Figure 2: Selfish and Altruistic Dishonesty by Treatment
Note: Error bars identify standard errors of the mean.
rank test, p = 0.002 pooling all treatments together). This result is driven by the UI and
EI treatments where the rate of selfish dishonesty is more than twice as big as the rate of
altruistic dishonesty (p = 0.003 and 0.01 respectively). In the two equitable treatments (EE
and UE), there is no statistically significant difference between the rate of altruistic and
selfish dishonesty (p = 0.760 and p = 0.734 respectively). To test hypotheses 3 and 4, we
can check whether the rate of altruistic dishonesty differs across treatments. On average,
the rate of altruistic dishonesty is larger in the equitable treatments (EE and UE) and in
EI compared to UI. However, the differences are not large enough to achieve statistical
significance (p > 0.1 for all pairwise comparisons). We can thus present our next result.
Result 2. Altruistic dishonesty is generally low (below 20%) and does not statistically differ
across treatments.
A possible explanation of this result is that only a few intrinsically-motivated subjects
are willing to misreport the signals to favor the counterpart (see Maggian and Villeval,
2016). Therefore, even if we hypothesize that unjust deserts has an effect on the behavior of
these subjects, it affects too small a proportion of the population to observe an effect at the
aggregate level.
Interestingly, if we classify subjects based on whether they truthfully or untruthfully
report the 25 signals (see Table 3), we find that a large proportion of those subjects who
misreported the signals to their disadvantage also, and to a larger extent, engage in selfish
dishonesty. We call these individuals randomizing selfish dishonest subjects. A possible ex-
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planation of their behavior is that these subjects want to balance out their selfish dishonesty
with some altruistic dishonesty in order to make their black lies appear as random mistakes
(recall that in our experiment the experimenter knows if a subject has misreported the signal
or not and, therefore, reputational costs may be very high). If the aversion to lie for personal
benefits is not (or not only) due to an intrinsic cost of lying but also to reputational con-
cerns as recent models suggest (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2016; Abeler et al., 2016; Dufwenberg and
Dufwenberg, 2016), some people could, instead of completely refraining from lying, alternate
some selfish lies with some (fewer) altruistic lies in order to signal that they are not really
liars but only “distracted” participants and, thus, reduce the reputational costs associated
with dishonesty.16 We also identify a handful of randomizing altruistic dishonest subjects
who balance out their altruistic dishonesty with some selfish dishonesty. Other categories
of subjects reported in Table 3 are fully selfish (altruistic) dishonest subjects who only re-
port green (red) signals, irrespective of the actual signal received; partially selfish (altruistic)
dishonest subjects who never misreport a green (red) signal and sometimes misreport a red
(green) signal; honest subjects who report truthfully all the signals; and noisy dishonest
subjects who misreport the same proportion of green and red signals.
Table 3: Percentages of honest and (selfish and altruistic) dishonest subjects
Types EE EI UE UI All Selfish Altruisticdishonesty dishonesty
Selfish dishonest 25% (6) 58.33% (14) 35.29% (6) 64.7% (11) 45.12% (37) 0.45 0.08
– Fully 0% (0) 12.5% (3) 11.76% (2) 5.88% (1) 7.32% (6) 1 0
– Partially 12.5% (3) 25% (6) 23.53% (4) 29.41% (5) 21.95% (18) 0.27 0
– Randomizing 12.5% (3) 20.83% (5) 0% (0) 29.41% (5) 15.85% (13) 0.44 0.22
Altruistic dishonest 16.66% (4) 16.67% (4) 29.41% (5) 5.88% (1) 17.08% (14) 0.16 0.57
– Fully 8.33% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 2.44% (2) 0 1
– Partially 8.33% (2) 4.17% (1) 17.65% (3) 0% (0) 7.32% (6) 0 0.39
– Randomizing 0% (0) 12.5% (3) 11.76% (2) 5.88% (1) 7.32% (6) 0.38 0.61
Honest 50% (12) 25% (6) 35.29% (6) 29.41% (5) 35.37% (29) 0 0
Noisy dishonesta 8.33% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 2.44% (2) 0.70 0.70
Notes: The frequencies are reported in parenthesis. The table also reports the mean rates of selfish and
altruistic dishonesty (last two columns). aOne noisy dishonest subject misreported all the signals. This
explains why, for this category, the rates of selfish and altruistic dishonesty are very high.
4.3 Overall dishonesty
Our measures of dishonesty used so far are appropriate if we think of the decision to be
dishonest as playing out independently for each signal received by the Custodian. Subjects,
however, may have a supergame in mind and try to realize an acceptable final distribution
over the course of the 25 signals irrespectively of which signals need to be misreported. This
16Of course, our experiment does not provide a precise test of this, and it is likewise possible that some lies
are genuine mistakes, even if it is difficult to believe that mistakes are systematic given the very simplistic
nature of the task. Nonetheless, we think it is an interesting finding to report which could be investigated
more in future research.
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is particularly relevant for randomizing dishonest subjects who misreport both green and red
signals. To analyze such a possibility, we measure honesty as the ratio of the total number of
red signals reported to the total number of red signals received (rate of red signals reported).
This measure takes into account both types of dishonesty, selfish and altruistic, and thus
could be greater than one if a subject engaged in altruistic white lies (i.e. reported the signal
as red when it was in fact green). Figure 3 displays the average rate of red signals reported
for each experimental treatment.17 If we conduct pairwise comparisons of the treatments,
honesty was statistically significantly lower in the UI treatment compared to the UE and EE
treatment respectively (p = 0.072 and 0.011), and in the EI treatment compared to the EE
treatment (p = 0.023).18 There is no statistically significant difference between EI and UI
(p = 0.706). This is in line with Result 1: subjects react to just deserts by reporting a larger
proportion of red signals when the income distribution is equitable and a smaller proportion
when the income distribution is inequitable.
Figure 3: Rate of Red Signals Reported
Notes: Error bars identify standard errors of the mean.
4.4 Dynamics
Since we have multiple observations for each custodian (subjects reported 25 signals), we
can also look at the dynamics of dishonesty. Indeed, it is possible that subjects lie only up
to a certain point at which just deserts is restored, and then no longer. If this is the case,
17Again, we find no differences between the sub treatments in EE and EI, so therefore pool the data.
18In comparing EI vs. UE, the p-value is just above the 10% level (i.e. p = 0.102). A one-sided test
provides a weakly significant result (p = 0.051).
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the hypothesized treatment effects would last only until a certain threshold of experienced or
misreported signals. To explore this possibility, we compare, for each treatment, the rate of
selfish dishonesty, altruistic dishonesty, and red signals reported respectively across periods.
We find no differences (Friedman tests, p ≥ 0.1 for all comparisons).19
There are two possible interpretations of this result. First, the majority of people may
find it easier to justify small lies spread over time rather than repeated lies in a short or
given period of time. This is consistent with the idea that people want to maintain a
positive self-image when they are lying (Shalvi et al., 2011; Mazar et al., 2008). A second
possible interpretation is that inequity has a fixed long-lasting effect on dishonest behavior
that persists irrispectively of whether just deserts is restored or not. Unfortunately, our
experiment does not enable us to disentangle between these two alternative explanations,
and we leave this for future research.
We can also look at how the difference in payoffs between custodian and owner evolves
over time as a result of violations of the just deserts principle. As already mentioned,
one behaves more (selfishly) dishonestly in response to violation of meritocracy in order to
modify one’s outcomes such that the resulting distribution is more equitable. If this is the
case, the difference in payoffs between custodian and owner should increase over time. This
is indeed what we find in Figure 4. As the graph shows, the relative payoff of the custodian
increases over time in the two inequitable treatments (Page’s trend tests, p = 0.004 in UI
and p < 0.001 in EI) but it is flat in the equitable treatments (p > 0.1 for both).20 We should
stress that this effect cannot be driven by equality concerns. Note in fact that inequality
increases in EI as a result of dishonesty. The figure also shows that the difference in payoffs
between custodian and owner increases at a steady rate. This confirms our previous finding
that dishonesty remains constant over time.
4.5 Regression analysis
To test the robustness of our results we conduct a regression analysis. In particular, we run
a logistic regression pooling all the data together. The dependent variable is a dichotomous
variable which takes value 1 if a signal is recorded as red and 0 if it is recorded as green.
We employ random effects to control for the non-independence of the observations at the
subject level (recall that we have 25 signals per subject).21 The independent variables are the
current private signal (1 if red, 0 if green), the number of consecutive periods without a green
signal (this controls for the idea that a long drought of green signals would make participants
19To minimize the impact of potential differences in the number of red signals received across periods, we
grouped the 25 signals in five-period blocks.
20See footnote 19.
21We have also run regressions with error clustering instead of random effects. The results are qualitatevely
the same and are available upon request.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the Difference in Payoffs Between Custodian and Owner
likely to lie more), the treatment dummies (the baseline category is the EE treatment),22
the signal period (2 to 25), the effort reported by the subject in the first real-effort task, and
interaction terms of the treatment dummies with the current private signal and the number
of consecutive periods without a green signal. Table 4 reports the average marginal effects.
The results of the regression analysis indicate that both self-reported effort and time
have no effect on the probability of reporting a red signal. Also, there is no effect in terms
of dynamics (i.e. number of consecutive periods without a private green signal). We can
contrast the marginal effects of receiving a private red or green signal across our different
treatments. Subjects were more likely to record a red signal when they received a private
red signal in EE and UE compared to both EI and UI (87% and 82.1% vs. 64.7% and 66.7%
respectively, p < 0.01 for all comparisons). The probability of reporting a red signal when
the private signal received was green (altruistic dishonesty) was in general low and similar
across treatments except in the UE treatment where it was significantly lower than the EE
treatment (10.7% vs. 23.3%, p = 0.047).
These results confirm Hypothesis 1 that increased dishonesty is associated with a decrease
in perceived just deserts quite independently of the equality of the incomes. They also
corroborate the insights gained from the previous analysis conducted using non-parametric
22In the on-line appendix, we also report the same regressions but with the two inequity treatments pooled
together (i.e. we use only one dummy to identify the treatments with inequity).
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Table 4: Regressions Results
Logit regression
dy/dx Std. Err. P>z
Effort −0.021 0.029 0.461
Round 0 0.001 0.972
Private signal = green
× EE 0.233 0.053 <0.001
× EI 0.156 0.04 <0.001
× UE 0.107 0.038 0.005
× UI 0.142 0.046 0.002
Private signal = red
× EE 0.858 0.038 <0.001
× EI 0.6 0.061 <0.001
× UE 0.853 0.048 <0.001
× UI 0.617 0.075 <0.001
N. periods without a green
× EE 0.006 0.01 0.545
× EI −0.014 0.01 0.185
× UE −0.018 0.013 0.158
× UI −0.004 0.015 0.784
Obs 2050
Df 13
Prob > F 0
tests.
5 Experiment 2
The focus of Experiment 1 is on a specific setting where dishonesty is instrumental
to re-establishing a just distribution between a person who benefited from inequity and
another who did not. It is however possible that the perception of unjust distributive rules
decreases the moral cost of dishonesty quite independently from re-distributional concerns.
In other words, the mere experience of inequity could induce a higher propensity to violate
the general norm of honesty even if dishonesty does not contribute to restore equity. To
test this possibility, we conducted Experiment 2. As in Experiment 1, we manipulate the
remuneration of the first stage as a function of the relative performance of the participants
in a real-effort task. We then test whether subjects behave more or less dishonestly in
a subsequent unrelated task which, unlike Experiment 1, does not allow for any income
redistribution.
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In what follows of this section, we discuss the main differences of Experiment 2 with
respect to Experiment 1 and we present the main hypotheses and results.
5.1 Participants and Procedures
We ran Experiment 2 at SBU, between December 2014 and March 2015. We recruited 232
subjects (excluding those who had participated in Experiment 1). Average earnings were
equal to $20.75. All the other procedures were the same as in Experiment 1.
5.2 Experimental Design
Experiment 2 is divided into three treatments: UI-no-match, EI-no-match, and UE-no-
match. The design is identical to Experiment 1 except for one key aspect: in the Custodial
Stage, subjects were not anymore matched in pairs.23 In particular, they were put in charge
of an account (which was not owned by another subject) and asked to record the color of
25 signals. Every time they recorded a green signal, they were entitled to take $0.60 from
the account, while every time they recorded a red signal, they had to leave the account
untouched. As in Experiment 1, subjects were instructed that it was only the recording
of the signal that affected their payoffs, not the signal itself. This time, however, no other
participant benefits or loses money from a mispresentation of the signal. Custodians when
lying do not take resources from another subject. Actually, they subtract resources from
the experimenter’s funds. Hence, a misrepresentation of the signal could not be used to
redistribute income from the non-deserving to the deserving subject. In addition, we got
rid of all possible influences (e.g. in-group or out-group biases) arising from inter-personal
comparisons with the matched subject.
In the UI-no-match treatment, the distribution of the income from the real-effort task
was unequal and inequitable (like in UI); in UE-no-match, it was unequal but equitable
(like in UE); and in EI-no-match, it was equal but inequitable (like in EI). The treatments
of Experiment 2 are summarized in Table 5. Using the observed differences between the
equitable and inequitable treatments in Experiment 1 as our baseline, a power analysis
reveals that we would need 35 subjects per conditions to detect such an effect at the 0.10
significance level. Thus, our design for Experiment 2 appears adequately powered.
23In Experiment 2, we also added two short incentivized tasks at the end of the experiment not related
to the current research question. They are briefly described in the on-line appendix. Note that these two
tasks could not distort subjects’ decisions since they were just added at the end of the session. Compared
to Experiment 1, we also collected more data to increase the statistical power of our tests since we expected
less dishonesty overall (recall that, in Experiment 2, we removed income redistribution as a potential motive
for behaving dishonestly).
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Table 5: Treatments of Experiment 2
Treatment Income distribution Matching
UE-no-match (74) Unequal and Equitable No matching
EI-no-match (88) Equal and Inequitable No matching
UI-no-match (70) Unequal and Inequitable No matching
Notes: Number of subjects in parenthesis. In EI-no-match, we conduct a high-income (40 subjects) and
low-income (48 subjects) sub-treatments to control for income effects. In the high-income (low-income)
condition, participants receive a remuneration of $10 ($3) after the real-effort task. Variation in the number
of participants reflects different attendance rates across sessions.
5.3 Behavioral Predictions
By comparing the different treatments of Experiment 2, we can investigate whether the mere
experience of inequity induces rule-disadvantaged subjects to violate the honesty norm to
their advantage in a context where dishonesty is not instrumental to restore equity. We
can study this for different levels of inequity: a “weak” level where equality is preserved
(EI-same-match) and a “strong” level where inequity goes hand in hand with inequality
(UI-same-match). More formally, the hypotheses that we test are the following:
Hypothesis 5. A strong (weak) form of meritocratic inequity induces rule-disadvantaged
subjects to behave more dishonestly even if equity cannot be restored: DUI-no-matchs > DUE-no-matchs
(DEI-no-matchs > DUE-no-matchs ).
Hypothesis 6. The impact of meritocratic inequity on the behavior of rule-disadvantaged
subjects is greater when it entails inequality: DUI-no-matchs > DEI-no-matchs .
We can then bridge the two experiments together (Experiments 1 and 2) to test whether
re-distributional concerns matter in explaining the relationship between meritocratic inequity
and dishonesty. This can be done by comparing the behavior of high-performing subjects
in the inequitable treatments across experiments. The main difference in the inequitable
treatments between the two experiments is whether a misreport affects or not the payoff
of another participant. If dishonesty is higher in Experiment 1 than 2, it means that re-
distributional concerns are an important explanation of the impact of meritocratic inequity
on honesty.
Hypothesis 7. Dishonesty is higher after a strong (weak) violation of the just deserts
principle if it helps to redistribute income from the undeserved to the deserved subjects:
DUIs > D
UI-no-match
s (DEIs > DEI-no-matchs ).
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in dishonesty between the two ex-
periments (DUI-no-matchs = DUIs and/or DEI-no-matchs = DEIs ), meaning that the impact of
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meritocratic inequity on honesty is not driven by re-distributional concerns.
In outlining the hypotheses above, our focus has been on the behavior of those subjects
who are expected to be more sensitive to inequity (i.e. subjects who were disadvantaged by
the performance-payoff mapping). In Experiment 2, we, by design, also collected data on the
behavior of rule-advantaged subjects. We report an analysis of their behavior in the on-line
appendix.
In the context of Experiment 1, we devised some hypotheses regarding altruistic dis-
honesty. In particular, we hypothesized that people could behave more or less dishonestly
to their disadvantage to obtain a more equitable final distribution of the income. These
re-distributional motives do not apply to Experiment 2. For this reason, we do not expect
to observe an effect of meritocratic inequity per se on altruistic dishonesty.
5.4 Results of Experiment 2
Figure 5: Selfish dishonesty, altruistic dishonesty and red signals reported in Experiment 2
(a) Panel A: Selfish dishonesty (b) Panel B: Altruistic dishonesty
(c) Panel C: Red signals reported
Note: Error bars identify standard errors of the mean.
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Figure 5 displays the rates of selfish dishonesty, altruistic dishonesty, and red signals re-
ported for high-performing subjects in all treatments of Experiment 2, and the corresponding
treatments of Experiment 1 (dotted bars).
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, we compare the level of selfish dishonesty of high-performing
subjects across the treatments of Experiment 2. We find that high-performing subjects lied
much more in UI-no-match than UE-no-match and EI-no-match respectively (p = 0.003
and 0.006), while there is no significant difference between UE-no-match and EI-no-match
(p = 0.983). A similar (but opposite) pattern is obtained if we compare the rate of red signals
reported (UI-no-match vs. UE-no-match, p = 0.003; EI-no-match vs. UE-no-match, p =
0.811; UI-no-match vs. EI-no-match, p = 0.013).24 We can thus report the following result
which supports Hypothesis 5 for the strong form of meritocratic inequity, and Hypothesis 6.
Result 3. A violation of the just deserts principle induces rule-disadvantaged subjects to
behave more dishonestly to their advantage even if this does not produce any income redis-
tribution. This effect only takes place when the initial (unjust) income distribution is also
unequal.
To investigate whether subjects react more to a violation of the just deserts principle if
they have the opportunity to redistribute income (Hypothesis 7), we compare the behavior
of high-performing subjects in the inequitable treatments of Experiments 1 and 2.25 We find
that subjects misreport fewer red signals in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 only
when the initial income distribution is equal (EI vs. EI-same, p = 0.075). In the unequal and
inequitable condition, we find (although not significantly) the opposite pattern (p = 0.108).26
This gives the following result which confirms Hypothesis 7 for the weak form of inequity,
but rejects it for the strong form.
Result 4. The absence of redistributive concerns reduces the amount of selfish dishonesty
only when inequity does not entail inequality.
To test the robustness of our results we conduct a regression analysis on the data of
Experiment 2. The specification is the same as in Experiment 1 except that we now employ
treatment dummies for Experiment 2 as explanatory variables (UI-no-match, EI-no-match,
and UI-no-match). Table 6 reports the marginal effects of the regression.
24As expected, we did not find statistically significant differences in altruistic dishonesty (p > 0.1 for all
comparisons).
25We also compare the behavior of high-performing subjects in the equitable treatments (UE and UE-no-
match). We find no difference in the rate of selfish dishonesty (p = 0.975), altruistic dishonesty (p = 0.255)
and red signals reported (p = 0.224).
26This also results in a significant lower rate of red signals reported (p = 0.054). In both inequitable
conditions, we also find that subjects in Experiment 2 misreport fewer signals to their disadvantage compared
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Table 6: Regression Results (Experiment 2)
Logit regression
dy/dx Std. Err. P>z
Effort −0.021 0.031 0.494
Round 0 0.001 0.673
Private signal = green
× UE-same 0.107 0.034 0.002
× EI-same 0.055 0.02 0.005
× UI-same 0.056 0.021 0.009
Private signal = red
× UE-same 0.682 0.058 < 0.001
× EI-same 0.691 0.054 < 0.001
× UI-same 0.432 0.06 < 0.001
N. periods without green
× UE-same −0.018 0.009 0.036
× EI-same −0.012 0.008 0.119
× UI-same −0.018 0.006 0.005
Obs 2900
Df 10
Prob > F < 0.001
Notes: The regression is conducted on the sample of high-performing subjects. In the on-line appendix, we
report the results of the regression with low-performing subjects.
In line with the results of Experiment 1, we find that self-reported effort and time have
no effect on the probability of reporting a red signal. Differently from Experiment 1, the
probability of reporting a red signal decreases if the number of consecutive periods without
a private green signal increases. This is statistically significant in the UE-same and UI-same
treatments (p = 0.036 and p = 0.005). If we contrast the marginal effects across treatments,
we find that high-performing subjects were less likely to record a red signal when they
received a private red signal in UI-same compared to both UE-same and EI-same (43.2% vs.
68.2% and 69.1% respectively, p < 0.01 for both comparisons). These results corroborate
the insights gained from the previous analysis conducted using non-parametric tests.
As we did for Experiment 1, we also analyzed the dynamics of dishonest behavior, and
classified subjects based on whether they truthfully or untruthfully report the 25 signals.
The results are similar to the findings of Experiment 1 and are presented in the on-line
appendix. As we mentioned earlier, we also look at the behavior of low-performing subjects
who benefited from the inequity condition. The results (reported in the on-line appendix)
to Experiment 1 (p = 0.003 for EI vs. EI-no-match, and p = 0.019 for UI vs. UI-no-match). This confirms
our previous claim that altruistic dishonesty is less observed when there are no re-distributional motives.
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suggest that the violation of the equity norm may also have some (weaker) spillover effects
on the behavior of rule-advantaged subjects.
6 Conclusion
The results of our experiments confirm our main prediction that the violation of the just
deserts principle induces greater selfish dishonesty on the part of those disadvantaged by this
violation. In Experiment 1, we find that the effect is the same irrespective of whether the
initial income distribution is equal or unequal. Once we remove the possibility to redistribute
income between rule-disadvantaged and advantaged subjects (Experiment 2), the effect of
(un)just deserts on dishonesty persists only when the initial payoffs are unequal. These
findings suggest that the violation of the equity norm has a spillover effect on dishonest
behavior—quite independently of redistributional motives—only when inequity is associated
with inequality. In other words, when the system is inequitable in producing an unequal
income distribution, people are willing to “rip it off” in turn, irrespective of whether dis-
honesty has a redistributive effect. In contrast, a weaker form of inequity which preserves
equality induces more dishonesty only when the latter is instrumental to re-establishing a
just income distribution between rule-disadvantaged and rule-advantaged individuals.
In both experiments, we also investigated whether a violation of just deserts induces
people to tell less altruistic white lies. We do not find evidence of this. We however find that
the majority of those who tell altruistic white lies also engage in self-serving dishonesty, and
to a larger extent than altruistic dishonesty, as if they wish to disguise their black lies as
simple mistakes. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show this kind of behavior.
Our experiments were conducted with American subjects, who are quite sensitive to
meritocratic concerns. Kunovich and Slomczynski (2007) provide evidence that the levels
of both actual and perceived meritocracy are quite high in the United States with respect
to other countries. Americans tend to have higher expectations for meritocracy, so they
may be more sensitive to its absence. Hence, if American experimental subjects are “pre-
treated” with higher expectations of just deserts, they can be more sensitive to violations
of the just deserts principle, reacting more and displaying a stronger connection between
inequity and dishonesty. A cross-national experimental comparison to assess the extent to
which our findings extend to other countries would therefore prove enlightening in terms of
the generality of the behavior we observe with American subjects. Comparative research is
particularly needed in this field, since if perceived levels both of honesty and just deserts
vary significantly among countries, there might be self-fulfilling beliefs at work to sustain
this diversity. We can imagine that countries in which the principle of just deserts is weaker
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might induce more dishonesty in their citizens.
Our study showed that individuals may respond to an absence of just deserts with dis-
honesty. This could result in a societal distribution of resources which is lacking to an
even greater degree in just deserts. In future research, it could be interesting to investigate
whether all this creates a self-reinforcing spiral into an ever-more dishonest and less virtuous
society.
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